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Preface:  
Several methods exist to estimate the cumulative carbon emissions which would keep global 
warming to below a given temperature limit. We here review estimates reported by the IPCC and the 
recent literature, and discuss the reasons underlying their differences. The most scientifically robust 
number – the carbon budget for CO2-induced warming only – is also the least relevant for real-world 
policy. Including all greenhouse gases and using methods based on scenarios that avoid instead of 
exceed a given temperature limit results in lower carbon budgets. To limit warming below the 
internationally agreed temperature limit of 2°C relative to preindustrial levels with >66% chance, the 
most appropriate carbon budget estimate is 590-1240 GtCO2 from 2015 onward. Variations within 
this range depend on the probability of staying below 2°C and on end-of-century non-CO2 warming. 
Current annual CO2 emissions are about 40 GtCO2/yr, and global CO2 emissions thus have to be 
reduced urgently to keep within a 2°C-compatible budget.   
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Main text:  
The ultimate objective of the international climate negotiations is to prevent dangerous 
anthropogenic interference with the climate system1. Since 2010, this objective has been interpreted 
as limiting global-mean temperature increase to below 2°C relative to preindustrial levels2, although 
discussion remains whether it needs to be strengthened to 1.5°C (for example, see Ref. 3). 
Over the past decade, a large body of literature has appeared which shows that the maximum global-
mean temperature increase as a result of carbon dioxide emissions is nearly linearly proportional to 
the total cumulative carbon (CO2) emissions4-11. Maximum warming is also influenced by the amount 
of non-CO2 forcing leading up to the time of the peak12-14. This has culminated in the most recent 
assessment of the Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change (IPCC) in the form of several 
estimates of emission budgets compatible with limiting warming to below specific temperature 
limits. Here, we first explain the underlying scientific rationale for such budgets and then continue 
with a detailed account of the strengths and limitations of the various budgets reported in both the 
IPCC Fifth Assessment Report (AR5) and the recent literature, and of the differences between them.  
The purpose of budgets  
The IPCC AR5 Working Group I (WGI) Report15 indicated that the total net cumulative emission of 
anthropogenic CO2 is the principal driver of long-term warming since preindustrial times. Therefore, 
to limit the warming caused by CO2 emissions to below a given temperature threshold, cumulative 
CO2 emissions from all anthropogenic sources need to be capped to a specific amount, sometimes 
referred to as carbon budget or quota (which, in the context of this paper, refers to global values and 
not to emission allowances of single countries).   
The near-linearity between peak global-mean temperature rise and cumulative CO2 emissions is the 
result of an incidental interplay of several compensating feedback processes in both the carbon cycle 
and the climate: the logarithmic relationship between atmospheric CO2 concentrations and radiative 
forcing, the decline of ocean-heat-uptake efficiency over time, as well as the change of the airborne 
fraction of anthropogenic CO2 emissions15. This compensating relationship is robust over a range of 
CO2 emissions and over timescales of up to a few centuries, with very few exceptions16. Such a 
relationship is not generally available for other anthropogenic radiatively active species. An 
approximate proportionality exists for other long-lived greenhouse gases (GHG) for warming during 
this century12, while for short-lived climate forcers the rate of emissions leading up to the time of 
peak warming is important12-14.  
The unique characteristics of the Earth system’s response to anthropogenic carbon emissions allow 
the definition of a quantity called the transient climate response to cumulative emissions of carbon 
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(TCRE). TCRE is defined as global average surface temperature change per unit of total cumulative 
anthropogenic CO2 emissions, typically 1000 PgC. The IPCC AR5 assessed TCRE to fall ‘likely’ (i.e. with 
greater than 66% probability17) between 0.8 to 2.5°C per 1000 PgC for cumulative CO2 emissions less 
than about 2000 PgC and until the time at which temperature peaks.  
The constancy of TCRE means that it can also be assessed for the real world by dividing an estimate 
of CO2-induced warming to date by an estimate of anthropogenic CO2 emissions5,10. Such an 
approach relies on a calculation of GHG-attributable warming using a regression of observed 
warming onto the simulated response to GHG and other forcings, and an estimate of the ratio of CO2 
to total GHG radiative forcing or temperature response. Alternatively TCRE may be assessed from 
observations by applying observational constraints to the parameters of a simple carbon-cycle 
climate model7,8, and evaluating the ratio of warming to emissions for the constrained model.  
For a carbon budget approach to make sense, TCRE must be reasonably independent of the pathway 
of emissions. Earlier studies have indeed shown that this is the case7,8,18,19, at least for peak warming 
and monotonously increasing cumulative carbon emissions. If a set carbon budget limit is exceeded, 
CO2 needs to be removed actively from the atmosphere afterwards20-22 to bring emissions back to 
within the budget. Figure 1 illustrates this path independency (even for moderate amounts of net 
negative CO2 emissions), and shows with the simple carbon-cycle and climate model MAGICC7,23,24 
that even with large variations in the pathway of CO2 emissions during the 21st century, the transient 
temperature paths as a function of cumulative CO2 emissions are very similar – a characteristic also 
found in other models18,25. Once all pathways achieve the same end-of-century cumulative CO2 
emissions, the temperature projections are virtually identical (Figure 1b).  
Given these considerations, carbon budgets are a useful guide for defining and characterizing 
emissions pathways which limit warming to certain levels, such as 2°C relative to preindustrial. 
An abundance of carbon budgets 
Budget for CO2-induced warming only 
The most direct application of TCRE is to derive cumulative carbon budgets consistent with limiting 
CO2-induced warming to below a specific temperature threshold. For instance, IPCC WGI indicates26 
that limiting anthropogenic CO2-induced warming to below 2°C relative to 1861-1880 with an 
assessed probability of greater than 50% will require cumulative CO2 emissions from all 
anthropogenic sources since that period to stay approximately below 4440 GtCO2. Alternatively, 
doing so with a greater than 66% probability would imply a 3670 GtCO2 budget. These values assume 
a normal distribution of which the standard-deviation (1-sigma) range is given by the assessed ‘likely’ 
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TCRE range of 0.8 to 2.5°C per 1000 PgC (i.e., about 3670 GtCO2), and make use of the near-linearity 
of the ratio of CO2-induced warming and cumulative CO2 emissions15.  
While being the most robust translation of the TCRE concept into a cumulative carbon budget, it is at 
the same time also the least directly useful to policy-making. In the real world, non-CO2 forcing also 
plays a role, and its global-mean temperature effect is superimposed on the CO2-induced warming. A 
carbon budget derived from a TCRE-based estimate should thus not be used in isolation. 
The near-linear relationship of TCRE does hence not necessarily apply to the ratio of total human-
induced warming to cumulative carbon emissions (as might be suggested by Figure SPM.10 in 
Ref. 26). The latter relationship is scenario dependent, because, for example, the percentage 
contribution of non-CO2 climate drivers to total anthropogenic warming increases in the future in 
many scenarios. Therefore, to take into account the influence of non-CO2 forcing on carbon budgets, 
the TCRE-based approach can be extended using multi-gas emission scenarios. Multi-gas emission 
scenarios provide an internally consistent evolution over time of all radiatively active species of 
anthropogenic origin. They are often created with “integrated assessment models” (IAMs) which 
represent interactions within the global energy-economy-land system (for examples, see Refs. 27-
29).   
Threshold exceedance budgets  
A first, straight-forward methodology to extend TCRE-based carbon budgets for CO2-induced 
warming to budgets that also take into account non-CO2 warming is here defined as threshold 
exceedance budgets (TEB) for multi-gas warming (see Table 1).  
This approach uses multiple realisations of the simulated response to a multi-gas emission scenario. 
These realisations can either be multi-model ensembles or perturbed parameter ensembles. An 
example of the former would be simulations of the Representative Concentration Pathways30,31 (RCP) 
by Earth-System Models (ESMs) that were contributed to the Fifth Phase of the Coupled Model 
Intercomparison Project32 (CMIP5). An example of the latter would be the use of a simple climate 
model in a probabilistic setup7,23,24, as used in the assessments of the IPCC33-35 as well as in other 
recent studies36-38. From such multi-model or perturbed parameter ensembles, the carbon budget is 
estimated at the time a specified share (for example, 50% or one third) of realisations exceeds a 
given temperature limit (i.e., 50% or two thirds of the ensemble members remain below the limit, 
see orange scenario in Figure 2).  
The TEB approach was used by IPCC WGI for determining carbon budgets that account for non-CO2 
forcing15. Applying this methodology to the CMIP5 RCP8.5 (Ref. 39) simulations of ESMs10,40 and 
Earth-System Models of Intermediate Complexity41 (EMICs), they found that compatible CO2 
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emissions since 1870 are about 3010 GtCO2 and 2900 GtCO2 to limit warming to less than 2°C since 
the period 1861–1880 in more than 50% and 66% of the available model runs, respectively. Other 
recent studies36 have used an extended version of this approach which computes TEBs based on 
perturbed parameter ensembles of a subset of scenarios from the IPCC AR5 Scenario Database 
(hosted at the International Institute for Applied Systems Analysis – IIASA, and available at 
https://secure.iiasa.ac.at/web-apps/ene/AR5DB/).  
The results of a TEB approach are most useful if the warming due to non-CO2 forcing as a function of 
cumulative CO2 emissions is similar across scenarios, meaning that the conclusions are not strongly 
dependent on the scenario chosen. However, Figure 3a shows that there is quite a large variation in 
non-CO2 forcing for a given level of cumulative CO2 emissions when looking at all scenarios available 
in the IPCC AR5 Scenario Database. Caution is therefore advised when deriving carbon budgets based 
on one single multi-gas scenario (see more below). Finally, the use of TEBs for limiting warming to 
below a given temperature limit, assumes that non-CO2 warming never increases beyond the level it 
reached at the time the TEB was computed (see Figure 2). Also non-CO2 forcing thus needs to be kept 
within limits over time.  
Threshold avoidance budgets  
Carbon budgets defined in the previous section are derived at the time a given scenario exceeds a 
specific temperature threshold or limit. A complementary approach is to consider multiple emission 
scenarios and evaluate carbon budgets for the subset of scenarios that avoid crossing such a 
threshold with a given probability. We name these budgets threshold avoidance budgets (TAB, see 
Table 1). Because, by definition, such scenarios do not exceed the limit of interest at any specific 
point in time (with a given probability), a time horizon needs to be defined until when a budget is 
computed. This time horizon can either be a predefined period, for example the 2011-2050 or the 
2011-2100 period, or more variable in nature, for example the time period until peak warming (see 
yellow scenario in Figure 2). Both of these approaches were used in the IPCC AR5, and more 
sophisticated approaches based on the TAB methodology have been used in the literature7. 
IPCC Working Group III (WGIII) computed TABs for the periods 2011-2050 and 2011-2100, by 
assessing the probabilistic temperature projections in 210034,35. For this, WGIII categorized a large 
number of scenarios based on end-of-century CO2-equivalent concentrations. The reported TAB 
values – for example, in Table 6.3 in the WGIII Report35 or Table SPM.1 in the Synthesis Report33,34 
(SYR) – are therefore the result of an assessment of the exceedance probability outcomes found in 
each of the CO2-equivalent concentration categories. Alternatively, scenarios could have been 
categorised on the basis of median temperature, probabilities to limit warming to below a specific 
temperature limit, or even carbon budgets. For scenarios that limit end-of-century warming to below 
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2°C with a ‘likely’ probability (greater than 66% chance), the IPCC AR5 WGIII assessment34 reports 
that the TABs in terms of cumulative CO2 emissions in the periods 2011-2050 and 2011-2100 are 150-
1300 GtCO2 and 630-1180 GtCO2, respectively. 
In the IPCC SYR33 TABs are also computed based on the scenarios available in the IPCC AR5 Scenario 
Database – see Table 2.2 in Ref. 33. However, the SYR categorizes scenarios directly based on their 
probability of keeping peak warming to below a specific temperature threshold (1.5°C, 2°C, or 3°C) 
during the 21st century. For example, the IPCC SYR reports TABs for limiting warming to below 2°C 
with at least 66% chance of 2550-3150 GtCO2 from 1870 until peak warming.  
The numbers compared  
To understand what the different approaches mean in terms of the actual values of carbon budgets, 
we compare the available budgets related to the 2°C limit. Table 2 provides an overview for all the 
numbers discussed in this section, relative to two common base years (2011 and 2015). Taking into 
account that about 2050 GtCO2 (ca. 560 PgC) of CO2 had already been emitted by the end of 2014 
(Ref. 36), a CO2-only budget approach would indicate that 1620 GtCO2 (or 440 PgC) remain to have a 
>66% probability of limiting warming to below 2°C relative to preindustrial levels (here defined as the 
1861-1880 period26). Using a TEB approach and assuming non-CO2 forcing as in RCP8.5, this amount 
is reduced to 850 GtCO2 (or 230 PgC). When assessed with the latter approach, a 1620 GtCO2 budget 
would limit warming to below 2°C in less than 33% of the available models (Ref. 42).  
It is worth noting that the IPCC assessment of the CO2-only budget is based on an assessed 
uncertainty range of TCRE, drawing upon many lines of evidence. The IPCC WGI numbers including 
non-CO2 forcing are based on CMIP5 simulations of the response to RCPs, which – although being a 
valid approach – provide a narrower scientific basis. At least for the four RCPs used by WGI, a similar 
warming as a function of cumulative CO2 emissions is found (see Figure TFE.8 in Ref. 42), despite 
having different non-CO2 evolutions (see Figure 3a). This counterintuitive result is explained further 
below.  
When extensively varying the non-CO2 assumptions for TEBs using a subset of baseline and weak 
mitigation scenarios from the IPCC AR5 Scenario Database (which all exceed the 2°C limit), a range of 
850-1550 GtCO2 (5th-95th percentile range across all TEB scenarios, from 2015 onward) is associated 
with limiting warming to below 2°C with 66% probability36. The difference between this range and 
the 850 GtCO2 number quoted above is, on the one hand, caused by the different modelling 
frameworks and, on the other hand, by the fact that the non-CO2 forcing evolution of RCP8.5 is 
situated amongst the highest percentiles of the non-CO2 forcing in other high emission scenarios that 
exceed the 2°C threshold (see Figure 3).   
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When considering TAB until peak warming, based on the stringent mitigation scenarios of the IPCC 
AR5 Scenario Database, a range of 590-1240 GtCO2 is found for limiting warming to below 2°C with 
>66% probability33 (10th-90th percentile range, as reported by IPCC WGIII, from 2015 onward). Finally, 
for TAB calculated over the 2015-2100 period, an assessment of the stringent mitigation scenarios 
available in the IPCC AR5 Scenario Database and their temperature outcomes results in a range of 
470-1020 GtCO2 (10th-90th percentile range) for limiting warming to below 2°C with a ‘likely’ (greater 
than 66%) chance35.  
In conclusion, moving from a CO2-only budget42 to a multi-gas multi-scenario TEB budget36 removes 
around 420 GtCO2 (i.e., the average of the 70-770 GtCO2 range) from the CO2 budget from 2015 
onward for limiting warming to below 2°C with 66% chance. Subsequently moving to a TAB budget 
until peak warming33 or over the 2015-2100 period35 and a >66% chance would additionally remove 
about 260-310 GtCO2 and 380-530 GtCO2, respectively. (Note that these values are illustrative as they 
are obtained by comparing ranges which are defined in different ways.)  
In conclusion, the TAB range for limiting warming to below 2°C with greater than 66% probability of 
470-1020 GtCO2 for the 2015-2100 period is thus 35 to 70% below what would have been inferred 
from a CO2-only budget with a TEB approach.  
Strengths and limitations  
The various approaches to computing carbon budgets each come with their respective strengths and 
limitations. Understanding what can lead to possible differences in budget estimates is critical to 
avoid misinterpretation of the numbers.  
The budget type definition, the underlying data and modelling, the scenario selection, temperature 
response timescales and the accompanying pathway of CO2 and non-CO2 emissions are identified as 
possible key drivers of the difference between the various budget options discussed above.  
That the budget type definition will have an influence on the resulting numbers is almost trivial. For 
example, when defining TABs from 2011 to 2100 instead of until peak warming, the cumulated net 
negative emissions which can be achieved until the end of the century will lead to consistently lower 
2015-2100 TABs compared to TABs defined until peak-warming levels. Negative emissions occur 
when carbon dioxide is actively removed from instead of emitted into the atmosphere by human 
activities. For instance, for TABs compatible with limiting warming to below 2°C with >66% chance, 
the difference between TABs defined until peak warming and over the 2015-2100 period would be of 
the order of 120-220 GtCO2. Furthermore, the budget type definition also influences other factors, 
like scenario selection, whose impact on the carbon budget is explained in more detail below.  
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Underlying data and modelling 
Some of the differences between the quantitative budgets estimates are simply driven by differences 
in the underlying data and models. In general, these differences apply to TEB and TAB alike. For 
example, while the WGI CO2-only budget is based on the interpretation of an assessed uncertainty 
range, the other TEB and TAB budgets were computed either from CMIP5 RCP results (in the WGI 
Report and the SYR) or from a simple climate model (MAGICC) in a probabilistic setup7,23,24 (in the 
WGIII Report and the SYR).  
Budget estimates can differ depending on whether a single-scenario multi-model ensemble is used 
(for example, all CMIP5 runs for RCP8.5) or alternatively a single-model multi-scenario perturbed 
parameter ensemble is used (for example, the IPCC AR5 WGIII approach which uses MAGICC). The 
former approach allows us to use information from a wide range of the most sophisticated models 
and incorporate state-of-the-art Earth-system interactions in the budget assessment. However, this 
approach comes at a high computational cost, resulting in only a limited ensemble of opportunity of 
model runs being available for any assessment. The latter method, on the other hand, uses a much 
simpler model, and hence comes with great computational efficiency which allows for hundreds if 
not thousands of realisations per scenario. This allows variations in scenario assumptions on the 
pathways and evolution of non-CO2 forcing over time to be explored in more detail. 
These differences in the underlying data and modelling can result in changes in the budget estimates. 
However, while a simple climate model does not provide the detail of ESMs, it can closely emulate 
their global-mean behaviour43 and can represent the uncertainties in carbon-cycle and climate 
response in line with the assessment of the IPCC AR5 (Refs. 7,24,44). Of importance here is that the 
MAGICC setup applied in WGIII and the SYR is consistent with the CMIP5 ensemble for temperature 
projections and TCRE (Figure 12.8 in Ref. 15, and Figure 6.12 in Ref. 35). It is therefore expected that 
these differences are limited.   
A final aspect related to the data and modelling is the interpretation of the nature of the 
uncertainties that accompany the various data. Uncertainty ranges can be the expression of a variety 
of underlying uncertainty sources45, and they can be interpreted in different ways. In the context of 
the quantification of carbon budgets, at least three kinds of uncertainty ranges can be distinguished: 
(1) an uncertainty range resulting from an in-depth assessment of multiple lines of evidence (a so-
called assessed uncertainty range); (2) an uncertainty range emerging from a sophisticated statistical 
sampling of the parameter space or; (3) an uncertainty range which represents the spread across an 
arbitrary collection of model results (a so-called ensemble of opportunity). Each of these uncertainty 
ranges can be interpreted in different ways, and they decline in robustness going from an assessed 
uncertainty range over targeted statistical approaches to ensembles of opportunities. These aspects 
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thus also influence the robustness of any carbon budget estimates based on them. For example, the 
budget for CO2-induced warming from WGI is derived from an assessed uncertainty range, while the 
WGI budgets that additionally take into account non-CO2 forcing are based on an ensemble of 
opportunity, which makes them much less robust (see also Technical Focus Element 8 in Ref. 42). 
Scenario selection 
Applying the definition of TEB and TAB budgets to a large scenario ensemble for the assessment of 
CO2 budgets in line with a particular temperature limit results in the selection of two disjoint subsets 
of emission scenarios: a subset of baseline and weak mitigation scenarios that exceed the 
temperature limit with a given probability in case of TEB budgets, and a disjoint subset of more 
stringent to very stringent mitigation scenarios that all keep warming to below the specified 
temperature limit with a given probability in case of TAB budgets.  
A first implication of the use of these disjoint scenario sets results from only very few scenarios being 
available that have, for example, precisely a 66% probability for limiting warming to below a given 
temperature threshold. While TEBs are consistently computed for each scenario at the time a 
scenario exceeds a temperature limit with a given probability, the value of TABs is further driven by 
the choice of the range of probabilities that is used to select appropriate TAB scenarios. For example, 
the IPCC SYR selected all scenarios that have a 66 to 100% probability of limiting warming to below a 
given threshold (compared to exactly 66% for TEB). This resulted in an average probability of staying 
below 2°C across the subset of TAB scenarios that comply with the abovementioned selection 
criterion of about 75%. This can explain about one third to half of the 260-310 GtCO2 difference 
between the TEB estimates from Friedlingstein et al. (Ref. 36) and the IPCC SYR TAB estimates. 
Moreover, for some temperature levels, for example around 3°C, the scenarios available in the IPCC 
AR5 Scenario Database do not sample the possible range extensively, which can lead to additional 
biases in the numbers obtained.  
Temperature response timescales 
A second aspect that is different in the disjoint scenario subsets are the CO2 emission pathways and 
hence the annual CO2 emissions at the time the compatible carbon budget is derived. In the TAB 
subset, CO2 emissions will typically approach zero or become negative in order to stabilize global 
temperatures, and will thus be very low at the time of maximum warming during the 21st century. In 
the TEB subset this is not the case. Because of the timescales of CO2-induced warming46,47 this leads 
to differences in the carbon budget estimates. 
Recent research indicates that, at current emission rates, maximum CO2-induced warming only 
occurs about a decade after a CO2 emission46,47. Thus, even in a CO2-only world, TABs and TEBs with 
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complementary probabilities (for example, a 66% probability to limit warming below 2°C and a 34% 
probability to exceed 2°C) would not be entirely identical. In case of the TEB approach, the maximum 
warming of the CO2 emissions of the last decade before the temperature limit was exceeded has 
possibly not yet fully occurred. In a TAB approach the emissions in the last decade would be 
significantly lower, if not zero, and this would allow a much larger fraction of the warming to already 
be realized. The TEB approach thus leads to a consistent overestimate of the CO2 budget compatible 
with a given temperature limit, while this is not the case with the TAB approach. At least one third of 
the approximately 260-310 GtCO2 difference between the TEB estimates from Ref. 36 and the IPCC 
SYR TAB estimates can be explained by accounting for the approximately one decade delay between 
CO2 emissions and their maximum warming. 
Non-CO2 warming contribution 
A third and last aspect that differs between the two disjoint TEB and TAB scenario subsets is the 
mixture of CO2 and non-CO2 forcers. This mixture differs over time and therefore, depending on 
when the compatible carbon budget is determined, the TAB and TEB are derived under possibly very 
different non-CO2 forcing (see Figure 3b). The relationship between CO2 emissions and non-CO2 
forcing is complex, as it covers the total non-CO2 forcing which results from both positive and 
negative climate forcers. Climate policy influences these non-CO2 forcers both directly (via 
abatement measures) and indirectly (via changes induced in the energy system), which is captured in 
different ways in IAMs. For example, stabilizing and peaking global temperatures requires global CO2 
emissions to be reduced to close to net zero. Such very low CO2 emissions are achieved through a 
fundamental transformation of the global energy-economy-land system35, which in turn leads to 
changes in non-CO2 emissions because of the phase-out of common sources of CO2 and non-CO2 
emissions14,48. This can lead to important differences in non-CO2 forcing as a function of total 
cumulative CO2 emissions (Figure 3a). Figure 3b shows that median non-CO2 forcing at the time 
which is of importance for deriving the carbon budget (i.e., the time of exceedance for TEBs, and 
peak warming for TABs) is about 0.2 W/m2 higher in the subset of scenarios used for TEBs compared 
to the subset used for TABs.  
However, the non-CO2 forcing at either peak warming or the time of exceeding a given temperature 
threshold does not tell the entire story. When estimating the actual non-CO2-induced warming at 
these time points of interest (see Box 1 on ‘Non-CO2 temperature contributions’), very little 
difference can be found between the TEB and TAB scenario subsets (Figure 3c). This thus suggests 
that, when a sufficiently large scenario sample is available, variations in non-CO2 forcing cannot be 
used to explain the variations between TEB and TAB estimates for limiting warming to below 2°C. The 
precise influence of this difference on the carbon budgets has not been quantified. 
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Incidentally, this feature is not obviously visible when looking at the four RCPs only, because both the 
lowest, RCP2.6, and the highest, RCP8.5, are outliers in terms of non-CO2 warming, at opposite sides 
of the scenario distribution (Figures 3b-c).  
Finally, while non-CO2 forcing does not provide a strong explanation for the variations between TEB 
and TAB estimates, it plays an important role for the variation within the TEB and TAB subsets. Figure 
3d shows that respectively 70% and 50% of the variance within the TEB and TAB subsets can be 
explained by non-CO2 warming at the time of determining the carbon budget.  
Future non-CO2 warming under stringent mitigation remains nonetheless very uncertain at present. 
Its magnitude will depend on the extent to which society will be successful in bringing about 
assumed future improvements in agricultural yields and practices or dietary changes49, amongst 
many other factors. These are very uncertain. Furthermore, how much non-CO2 forcing is reduced 
compared to CO2 depends on the relative weight that is given to CO2 and non-CO2 emissions in 
mitigation scenarios, and also on other mitigation choices50. These weights are mostly constant in 
IAMs (for example, by using global warming potentials as a fixed exchange rate), but can also change 
over time and depend on the question posed.   
Air pollution controls can influence the rate of near-term warming and, depending on the precise mix 
of air pollutants that is reduced by air pollution controls, non-CO2 warming can be increased, 
decreased or stay constant14. The estimated effect of air pollution controls on carbon budgets, in 
particular on TABs, is very small51. This is important information for policy-making, as it can be used 
to consider trade-offs between the uncertainty in non-CO2 mitigation, possibly larger CO2 budgets, 
and a larger amount of committed warming at the multi-century scale due to larger cumulative CO2 
emissions.  
Applicability 
Earlier we indicated that budgets that only take into account CO2-induced warming are scientifically 
best understood as – per definition – they do not depend on additional uncertainties associated with 
other forcings. However, at the same they are impractical and largely irrelevant for use in the real 
world, because of their obvious limitation of neglecting any contribution that is different from CO2. 
The other approaches that go beyond this CO2-only approach, might therefore be more practical. 
Using a CO2-only approach estimate for real-word decision-making would lead to an overestimation 
of the allowable carbon budget, i.e. a very high risk of exceeding a given climate target when 
emitting that particular carbon budget.  
The strength of TEBs is that they are easily comparable to TCRE-based budgets for CO2-induced 
warming only. Hence the influence of non-CO2 forcing on the size of carbon budgets can be assessed. 
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However, because of the limitations related to scenario selection (TEBs are derived from scenarios 
that fail in limiting warming to the temperature level of interest) and the timescales of the 
temperature response, TABs are preferred over TEBs. The strength of TABs lies exactly in their use of 
scenarios that represent our best understanding of how CO2 and other radiatively active species 
would evolve over time when CO2 emissions are stringently reduced.  
Conclusions  
Several possibilities are available to compute cumulative carbon budgets consistent with a particular 
temperature limit. We have shown that each of the CO2 budget approaches has strengths but also 
comes with important limitations. The devil is in the detail here. The most scientifically robust 
number – the budget for CO2-induced warming – is also the least practical in the real world. Selecting 
budgets based on multi-gas emission scenarios that actually restrict warming to below a given 
temperature threshold, results in the lowest, but most relevant CO2 emission budgets in a real-world 
multi-gas setting. Any practical implementation of a carbon budget mitigation strategy would require 
parallel mitigation efforts for non-CO2 agents.  
At the time of the IPCC AR5, no established methodologies were available to ensure easy 
comparability of carbon budget estimates across working groups. In hindsight and anticipating future 
assessments, three recommendations can be formulated. First, insofar important topics can already 
be identified, coordinated model simulations, intercomparisons, and methods could be initiated at 
an early stage to ensure consistency and traceability. Second, consistency across – and collaboration 
and integration between – the IPCC working groups could be improved by setting up stronger ties 
between them. And third, IPCC reports should be clearer about the policy-applicability of the 
numbers they provide, without being policy prescriptive. 
For limiting warming to below 2°C relative to preindustrial levels with greater than 66% probability, 
the remaining CO2 budget from 2015 onwards for CO2-induced warming only is 1620 GtCO2. The 
corresponding TAB budget would be 590-1240 GtCO2. The latter is equivalent to about 15 to 30 years 
of CO2 emission at current (2014) levels (about 40 GtCO2/yr, Ref. 52). No matter which approach is 
taken, the CO2 budget for keeping warming to below 2°C always implies stringent emission 
reductions over the coming decades and net zero CO2 emissions in the long term. For policymaking in 
the context of the UNFCCC, we suggest using the 590-1240 GtCO2 estimate from 2015 onward, as 
this is derived from an assessment of scenarios that effectively limit warming to below the 2°C limit. 
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BOX 1: Non-CO2 temperature contributions 
The estimated temperature contributions of non-CO2 forcing, shown in Figure 3c, are derived by the 
following equation, as described in the Supplementary Material to the IPCC AR5 Working Group I 
Chapter on ‘Anthropogenic and Natural Radiative Forcing’53 (equation 8.SM.13).  
்ܴ(ݐ) =෍ ௝ܿ௝݀ ݁ݔ݌ ቆ−
ݐ
௝݀
ቇ
ெ
௝ୀଵ
 
Where RT is the climate response to a unit of forcing, cj the component of the climate sensitivity, dj 
the response times, and t the time. For the two-term approximation (M=2) presented by Ref. 54, 
values of c1, c2, d1, and d2 are taken from Table 8.SM.9 in Ref. 53. This estimate is to be considered an 
illustrative approximation of the non-CO2 forcing’s temperature effect.  
END BOX 1 
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Figure captions: 
 
Figure 1 | Proportionality of global-mean temperature increase to cumulative emissions of CO2. 
Four CO2 emission pathways with identical cumulative carbon emissions over the 21st century (panel 
a) and their corresponding temperature projections (panel b). The grey area in panel b shows the 
central 66 percent uncertainty range of temperature projections around the thick purple line. Panels 
are adapted from Figure 12.46 in Ref. 15. 
 
Figure 2 | Illustration of the approach to compute threshold exceedance budgets (TEB) versus 
threshold avoidance budgets (TAB). In a first step (arrows labelled “1”), temperature outcomes are 
computed from multi-gas emission scenarios which either exceed (orange) or avoid (yellow) a given 
temperature threshold. Based on either the timing of exceeding the chosen threshold or the timing 
of peak warming, carbon budgets compatible with the chosen temperature threshold are computed 
in a second step (arrow labelled “2”) by summing the carbon emissions of the underlying scenarios 
until the timing of exceeding the threshold or peak warming for TEB or TAB (arrow labelled “3”), 
respectively.  
 
Figure 3 | Non-CO2 forcing and cumulative CO2 emissions. a, Non-CO2 forcing as a function of 
cumulative CO2 emissions from 2015 onwards for scenarios of the IPCC AR5 Scenario Database. 
Scenarios are split up into two subsets: (1) scenarios that limit warming to below 2°C relative to 
preindustrial with at least 66% probability (yellow-mustard, used for TAB) and (2) scenarios that lead 
to global-mean temperatures exceeding the 2°C relative to preindustrial limit with at least 34% 
(orange, used for TEB). b, Distribution of non-CO2 forcing at the time point critical for deriving TEB 
(orange) and TAB (yellow-mustard) budgets, i.e., the moment the 2°C limit is exceeded for TEBs and 
peak warming for TABs. c, Distribution of the estimated temperature contribution from non-CO2 
forcing at the same time point as in panel b (see Box 1 on ‘Non-CO2 temperature contributions’). The 
four RCPs are also included for comparison. d, Variation within the TEB and TAB budget subsets as a 
function of the estimated temperature contribution from non-CO2 forcing as in panel c. Numerical 
values in panel d are R2 values for the two linear fits.  
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Tables: 
 
Table 1 | Three different types of carbon budgets and their definition 
 
Carbon budget type Abbreviation Definition and description
Budget for CO2-
induced warming 
CO2-only 
budget 
Amount of cumulative carbon emissions that are compatible with 
limiting warming to below a specific temperature threshold with a 
given probability in the hypothetical case that CO2 is the only source 
of anthropogenic radiative forcing. This budget can be inferred from 
the assessed range of TCRE.  
Threshold 
Exceedance Budget 
TEB Amount of cumulative carbon emissions at the time a specific 
temperature threshold is exceeded with a given probability in a 
particular multi-gas emission scenarios. This budget thus takes into 
account the impact of non-CO2 warming at the time of exceeding the 
threshold of interest.  
Threshold  
Avoidance Budget 
TAB Amount of cumulative carbon emissions over a given time period of a 
multi-gas emission scenario that limits global-mean temperature 
increase to below a specific threshold with a given probability. This 
budget thus takes into account the impact of non-CO2 warming at 
peak global-mean warming, which is approximately the time global 
CO2 emissions become zero and global-mean temperature is 
stabilized. 
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Table 2 |Selection of carbon emission budgets related to a global temperature limit of 2°C relative 
to preindustrial levels from various sources. 1890 GtCO2 were already emitted by 2011, and about 
2050 GtCO2 by 2015. All values are in GtCO2, reported from 2011 and 2015 onwards, and rounded to 
the nearest 10. Budget types are defined in Table 1. 
 
Source Type Specification Value since 
2011 
Value since 
2015 
IPCC AR5 
WGI  
CO2-
only 
budget 
To limit warming to less than 2°C since the 
period 1861-1880 with greater than 66% (or 
50%) probability 
1780
(or 2550) 
1620 
(or 2390) 
IPCC AR5 
WGI 
TEB To limit warming to less than 2°C since the 
period 1861-1880 in more than 66% (or 50%) of 
the model runs when accounting for the non-CO2 
forcing as in the RCP scenarios 
1010
(or 1120) 
850 
(or 960) 
IPCC AR5 
WGIII 
TAB To limit warming in 2100 to below 2°C since 
1850-1900 with a ‘likely’ (>66%) probability, 
accounting for the non-CO2 forcing as spanned 
by the subset of stringent mitigation scenarios in 
the IPCC AR5 Scenario Database*. (10%-90% 
range over scenarios in IPCC WGIII scenario 
category 1) 
630 to 
1180 
470 to 
1020 
IPCC AR5 
WGIII 
TAB To limit warming in 2100 to below 2°C since 
1850-1900 with a ‘more likely than not’ (>50%) 
probability, accounting for the non-CO2 forcing 
as spanned by the subset of stringent mitigation 
scenarios in the IPCC AR5 Scenario Database*. 
(10%-90% range over scenarios in IPCC AR5 
scenario category II without overshoot) 
960 to
1430 
800 to 
1270 
IPCC AR5 SYR TEB To limit warming to less than 2°C since the 
period 1861-1880 in more than 66% (or 50% or 
33%) of the model runs of the CMIP5 RCP8.5 
ESM and EMIC simulations. (These correspond to 
the IPCC AR5 WGI TEB budgets reported above) 
1010 
(1110 or 
1410) 
850 
(960 or 
1250) 
IPCC AR5 SYR TAB To limit warming to below 2°C since 1861-1880 
with 66-100% probability, accounting for the 
non-CO2 forcing as spanned by the subset of 
stringent mitigation scenarios in the IPCC AR5 
Scenario Database. (10%-90% range) 
750 to
1400 
590 to 
1240 
IPCC AR5 SYR TAB To limit warming to below 2°C since 1861-1880 
with 50-66% probability, accounting for the non-
CO2 forcing as spanned by the subset of stringent 
mitigation scenarios in the IPCC AR5 Scenario 
Database. (10%-90% range) 
1150 to 
1400 
990 to 
1240 
Friedlingstein 
et al. (2014) 
TEB To limit warming to less than 2°C since 1850-
1900 with a 66% probability, accounting for the 
non-CO2 forcing as spanned by the subset of 
baseline and weak mitigation scenarios in the 
IPCC AR5 Scenario Database*. (5%-95% range) 
1310 
(1010 to 
1710) 
1150 
(850 to 
1550) 
Friedlingstein 
et al. (2014) 
TEB To limit warming to less than 2°C since 1850-
1900 with a 50% probability, accounting for the 
non-CO2 forcing as spanned by the subset of 
baseline and weak mitigation scenarios in the 
IPCC AR5 Scenario Database*. (5%-95% range) 
1610
(1210 to 
2010) 
1450 
(1050 to 
1850) 
*: The temperature difference between the 1861-1880 and 1850-1900 is 0.02°C, based on Ref. 55 
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